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A Road Paved with Good Intentions
State and local efforts to conduct foreign policy and
the application of South African sanctions to Namibia.
By Antonio F. Perez*
W hen the Framers met at
~the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, the United States
were-to use the then ap-
plicable grammatical convention-a
confederation. Today, the plural usage is
considered archaic. Similarly, its under-
lying constitutional concept is ordinarily
thought to be a relic of our constitution-
al past. The states are no longer coequal
sovereigns, each retaining its interna-
tional personality and thus the capacity
to conduct international relations. We
are instead united as one federal nation,
each state competent only to address in-
ternal matters and the federation alone
responsible for conducting the nation's
external relations.
Modern constitutional practice, how-
ever, is not quite as congruent with this
received constitutional theory as one
would imagine. In recent years, and with
increasing frequency, states and cities
have intruded on the federal govern-
ment's conduct of foreign policy.
Whether in adopting nonbinding reso-
lutions and referenda on questions of
foreign policy, or declaring themselves
"sanctuaries" for Central American
refugees or "nuclear free zones," states
and cities have raised their own voices in
matters once reserved to the Executive
Branch and the Congress alone.' Today,
foreign embassies in Washington would
be negligent in their duties if they ig-
nored the activities of state legislatures
or even city councils, whose influence
can be felt far from U.S. borders. If, for
example, some major states or cities
were to bar from their municipal bond
markets all banks doing business in a
particular country, it is highly probable
those banks would abandon their clients
in that country. The effect on the target
country could be as great as if the Unit-
ed States itself had imposed economic
sanctions.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest
that, in many respects, the United States
no longer "speaks with one voice" in the
conduct of its foreign policy. This is
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borne out by one particularly illuminat-
ing example of state and local foreign
policy-sanctions against South Africa
to end apartheid. Because South Africa
occupied Namibia at the time many of
these measures were adopted, states and
localities applied their South Africa
sanctions to Namibia as well. For the
most part, these measures were imposed
out of moral outrage against apartheid.
States and localities responded to their
constituents' desires to prevent the use
of state resources, even if only indirectly,
in apparent support of apartheid.
Yet, sanctions against South Africa
have proven to be the proverbial "hard
case" that makes "bad law." They reveal
the danger of state and local forays into
foreign policy making, as states and lo-
calities continued to apply their South
Africa sanctions to Namibia's detriment
even after Namibia achieved its indepen-
dence from South Africa on March 21,
1990, and despite the fact that Namibia's
independence was a long-standing goal
of U.S. policy in southern Africa. In the
author's opinion, the application to
Namibia of state and local sanctions
against South Africa was a foreign policy
time bomb waiting to explode.
U.S. Policy Toward Namibia
It had long been U.S. policy to re-
verse South Africa's unlawful occupa-
tion and administration of the territory
of Namibia. Formerly known as South-
West Africa, Namibia was a German
colony administered after World War I
by South Africa, on behalf of the United
Kingdom and under a League of Na-
tions mandate. After World War II,
South Africa refused to conclude a
trusteeship agreement with the United
Nations (U.N.) to resolve the status of
the mandate and, claiming sovereignty
over Namibia, began to implement
apartheid.2
Dissatisfied with South Africa's refusal
to carry out the mandate, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in Resolution 2145 (XXI)
of October 27, 1966 terminated the
mandate.' This decision was reaffirmed
on January 30, 1970 by the Security
Council in Resolution 276, which de-
clared "the continued presence of the
South African authorities in Namibia il-
legal."4 Finally, at the Security Council's
request, the International Court of Jus-
tice (I.C.J.) rendered an Advisory Opin-
ion on June 21, 1971 confirming the
General Assembly's power to terminate
the mandate. The United States voted
in favor of the relevant General Assem-
bly and Security Council resolutions,"
and also appeared before the I.C.J. to
argue that the General Assembly Resolu-
tion was "valid and that it effectively ter-
minated the administrative authority of




The U.S. commitment was manifested
in far more than mere votes and rhetoric.
The U.S. expended enormous time and
energy to secure Namibia's indepen-
dence over a ten-year, bipartisan, diplo-
matic odyssey, beginning during the
Carter administration with a plan for
Namibia's independence, proposed ini-
tially at the U.N. Security Council by the
representatives of Canada, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Unit-
ed Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the United States (the
Contact Group).' By Resolution 435 of
September 29, 1978, the Security Council
approved the Secretary General's plan to
implement the Contact Group proposal
and established a U.N. Transitional Assis-
tance Group (U.N.T.A.G.) to "ensure the
early independence of Namibia through
free and fair elections under the supervi-
sion and control of the United Nations.""
South Africa objected to certain ele-
ments of the U.N. plan, initially refused
to implement Resolution 435, and pro-
ceeded instead with unilateral elections
in Namibia." Later, it also objected to
the continued deployment of Cuban
troops in Angola. 1 In negotiations from
1978 through 1988, South Africa's ob-
jections to the U.N. plan were ad-
dressed. The question of withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola was also re-
solved in the Agreement of December
22, 1988, between the People's Republic
of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and
the Republic of South Africa. In this Tri-
partite Agreement, the People's Repub-
lic of Angola and Cuba agreed to the
phased and total withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola in accordance with
their separate Bilateral Agreement of
the same date, and South Africa agreed
to implement the U.N. plan for Namib-
ia's independence. 2 Then, with modifi-
cations contained in reports by the Sec-
retary General to the Security Council,
the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 632 of February 16, 1989, authoriz-
ing U.N.T.A.G. to deploy in Namibia no
later than April 1, 1989, to begin imple-
mentation of the U.N. Plan for Namib-
ia's independence. 3
The Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Chester Crocker, medi-
ated the negotiations for the Tripartite
Agreement. The fruit of these efforts
was the achievement of two long-stand-
ing goals of U.S. policy in southern
Africa: South Africa's agreement on
granting Namibia independence based
on a new, democratic constitution draft-
ed by a constituent assembly that would
be elected in U.N.-supervised free and
fair elections; and the removal of Cuban
intervention forces from the Angolan
civil war.'4
Accordingly, on March 21, 1990, the
President welcomed Namibia's indepen-
dence and announced the United States'
intention to commence good economic
relations with the new nation, stating:
The United States established diplo-
matic relations with the Republic of
Namibia today, and we will take the
necessary steps to exchange Ambas-
sadors as quickly as possible. We wel-
come Namibia as a full trading partner
and are taking steps to ensure that it is
given access to the American market.
With the end of South Africa's admin-
istration, all U.S. sanctions against
Namibia are being lifted. 5
Thereafter, in a letter to state gover-
nors, the State Department urged states
and localities "to terminate measures
they have imposed that are inconsistent
with good economic relations between
the United States and Namibia."'6
It should be noted that in 1970, after
the termination of the mandate, the U.S.
Government had announced its inten-
tion not to represent the interests of any
U.S. persons investing in Namibia after
the termination of the mandate, on the
theory that South Africa no longer was
competent to grant access to Namibian
natural resources.' 7 Much later, U.S.
sanctions against South Africa under the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 (the CAAA) were also applied to
Namibia, because the CAAA specifically
defined South Africa to include "any ter-
ritory under the administration, legal or
illegal, of South Africa.""' These and
other Executive acts had created a web
of special burdens for Namibian com-
merce in the United States. Because of
changed circumstances, however, the
President reversed over two decades of
federal policy virtually overnight.
[T]he case of state and
local sanctions against
South Africa and
Namibia is a textbook
example of the argument




The same cannot be said for states'
and localities' management of their own
foreign policies. After the Republic of
Namibia became independent on
March 21, 1990, many states and locali-
ties failed to follow the federal example
of lifting sanctions, continuing to penal-
ize the very victims of apartheid in
Namibia their sanctions were originally
intended to benefit. The State Depart-
ment's letters to states and localities fol-
lowing Namibia's independence ap-
peared to have little effect. According to
the Investor Responsibility Research
Council, as of November 1990, forty-two
states and localities retained sanctions
against Namibia. As of this writing, three
states and twenty cities and countries
continued to retain these sanctions. 9
There is, of course, a serious question
whether, even before Namibia's inde-
pendence, state and local sanctions
against South Africa (and by extension,
Namibia) were inconsistent with the fed-
eral government's exclusive power to
manage the nation's foreign relations or
with the federal government's control of
foreign commerce under the dormant
commerce clause. 0 A case can also be
made that such measures were preempt-
ed by the CAAA.21 It is clear, however,
that state and local South Africa sanc-
tions have had the unintended effect of
hampering Namibia's development as a
market-oriented democracy, undercut-
ting the federal government's efforts in
this direction and embarrassing the




The federal government's exclusive
management of U.S. policy, including its
policy towards Namibia, is firmly based
in the text, structure and history of the
U.S. Constitution. The Framers' design
was a practical effort to avoid repeating
apparent weaknesses of the Articles of
Confederation, which in the first years of
independence permitted thirteen differ-
ent sovereigns to conduct thirteen differ-
ent foreign policies. The prospect of
multiple and inconsistent obligations
and undertakings then jeopardized the
very survival of the United States. It was
for this reason that the constitution con-
solidated authority over foreign relations
powers in the federal government.2
The clauses of the Constitution specifi-
cally touching on questions relating to
foreign affairs confirm this understand-
ing. For example, the Constitution pro-
vides that the President "Shall have the
Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties" and
"by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors.""
He alone may "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers."2 4 The Constitu-
tion even explicitly denies states any in-
dependent authority to conclude treaties
or other international agreements, for it
provides "No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,"" and
"no State shall, without the consent of
Congress .... enter into any Agreement
or Contract with another State, or with a
foreign Power . . . . 26 Notably, 'Treaties
made . . .under the Authority of the
United States"-- rather than also those
made under the authority of the mem-
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bers of the Confederation individual-
ly-"shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land."27 Finally, the constitutionally-pre-
scribed original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court extends to "all Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consul ... ,,"2 thus ensuring
that the nation speaks with one voice in
even the most mundane juridical ques-
tions relating to foreign emissaries.
29
In sum, our constitutional framework
could not be clearer. Yet none of these
bulwarks of federal supremacy and ex-
clusivity in foreign affairs has held back
the tide of state and local forays into for-
eign policy.
The Theory for Non-Federal
Foreign Policy
States and localities could in theory
draw on various constitutional sources
to defend their foreign policy activities.
Arguments could be framed in terms of
general principles of federalism to de-
fend procurement restrictions, or per-
haps, under principles of freedom of
speech, to defend legislative resolutions
which purport only to express a point of
view. Yet the behavior of state and local
representatives is conditioned more by
their desire to be reelected than the pre-
cise allocation of constitutional authori-
ty over foreign affairs." Thus, states and
localities have responded to political
pressure by adopting their own sanc-
tions. Perhaps because of the serious
constitutional questions raised by these
efforts, most state and local measures on
South Africa, taken individually, are in
fact quite pedestrian. They generally
take only two forms. In one, the govern-
mental unit requires managers of its em-
ployee pension funds to prohibit or con-
dition investment in U.S. corporations
doing business in South Africa. In the
second form, the governmental unit re-
quires its purchasing agents to prohibit
or condition procurement from U.S.
corporations doing business in South
Africa.
The rationale for both types of mea-
sures, however, is the same: the govern-
mental unit, ostensibly in its capacity as
a market participant rather than market
regulator, has chosen to set aside purely
economic concerns and incorporate po-
litical or moral desiderata in deciding
how to invest funds for which it is re-
sponsible and from whom to purchase
goods and services.1
Taken together, state and local mea-
sures can have a serious impact. Given
the differences in the phrasing and im-
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plementation of these laws and regula-
tions, they result in a plethora of over-
lapping and conflicting requirements
from state to state, and locality to locali-
ty. In some cases, any goods or services
originating in South Africa are barred;
still others cover goods or services pro-
vided by South African incorporated en-
tities, regardless of whether the goods
or services themselves originate in
South Africa. Thus, to ensure it is eligi-
ble for a significant share of state and
local government business, a prudently
managed U.S. corporation would be in-
clined to conform its business in South
Africa to the strictest applicable state or
local standard. Because of the number
and variety of measures, corporate
counsel may assume the worst and ad-
vise their clients to terminate operations
in South Africa to avoid unnecessarily
jeopardizing potential U.S. business.
No federal court has addressed the
constitutional issues posed by these
measures. However, the highest court of
the State of Maryland has sustained a
City of Baltimore ordinance barring the
investment of city pension funds in cor-
porations doing business in South
Africa. 3 Relying heavily on the trial
court's finding of fact that the Ordi-
nance itself had only a minimal and in-
direct impact on South Africa, the court
held that the Ordinance did not uncon-
stitutionally interfere with the federal
government's exclusive power to man-
age U.S. foreign policy.3" The court also
relied in part on "market participant"
doctrine, under which a state may dis-
criminate in investment and procure-
ment decisions in favor of its own citi-
zens, to sustain the ordinance against
dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
3 4
Finally, it concluded that the Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 did
not preempt-or "occupy the field"
of-U.S. sanctions against South Africa
so as bar state measures by implication.
The court's discussion illustrates the
complexities of these constitutional and
statutory interpretive issues; given the
difficulties, it would appear prudent for
states and localities to adopt a healthy
degree of self-restraint in this area. The
court's decision, for example, appears to
suggest that the City of Baltimore may
purport to encourage the dismantling of
apartheid, but only when the measures
through which it chooses to implement
that policy are largely ineffective. The
decision thus seems to avoid confronting
the constitutional principle that states
not implement separate foreign policies,
which is the major premise of the
Supreme Court's leading statement on
the federal foreign relations power, Zsch-
ernig v. Miller.
In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an
Oregon law under which foreign nation-
als could not claim an inheritance when
their country's laws did not provide U.S.
citizens the same rights, on the theory
that the law had "more than 'some inci-
dental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries'. " - Unlike the Maryland Court of
Appeals, in deciding whether the Zsch-
ernig test is met, courts may wish to evalu-
ate the cumulative impact a measure
would have were it to become the rule
for every other state." Similar reasoning
is invoked to determine, for example,
the scope of the Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. 7 More impor-
tant, focusing their analysis on the hypo-
thetical cumulative impact of state and
local sanctions would help courts pre-
serve their role as neutral guardians of
the constitutional separation of authority
between the federal government and the
states by allowing them to avoid difficult
judgments as to the effect of a particular
measure on U.S. foreign policy.
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The Maryland court also thoroughly
analyzed the preemption issue. Yet, it
may not have given Congress's own ar-
ticulation of its intent the wide berth it
deserved. Section 4 of the CAAA ex-
pressly states the CAAA is intended to
"set forth a comprehensive and com-
plete framework to guide the efforts of
the United States in helping bring about
an end to apartheid in South Africa.""9
Moreover, the CAAA implied that after a
specific date, the federal government
could take action to enforce the foreign
policy articulated in Section 4. Section
606 barred the reduction of federal con-
tributions to states or the imposition of
any other federal penalty "by reason of
application of any state or local law con-
cerning apartheid . . . for 90 days after"
the CAAA's enactment.40 This limited
safe-harbour rule supports the interpre-
tation that Congress contemplated that
states and localities would cease apply-
ing their anti-apartheid ordinances.
The Congress later adopted an addi-
tional safe-harbour provision for state
and local rules on procurement from
South Africa. 1 Like Section 606 of the
CAAA, this measure limited the Execu-
tive Branch's power to deny-essentially
as a means to enforce federal foreign
policy-funds appropriated by Congress
for transportation projects in offending
states and localities. It does not suggest
the Congress intended to overturn the
preemptive effect of the CAAA or ap-
prove state and local foreign policy-mak-
ing that would otherwise intrude on the
federal government's exclusive compe-
tence in foreign relations.
One last point may shed light on the
preemption issue. The Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 itself man-
dates the termination of a broad range
of sanctions against South Africa when
the government meets certain specific
conditions. This suggests that Congress
intended to create an integrated statuto-
ry scheme to maximize the effect of fed-
eral sanctions by providing rewards for
specific progress. The retention of state
and local measures that would undercut
the effect of the integrated federal
scheme could thus subvert the purposes
of the CAAA.
The issue of greatest general interest
in the Maryland court's opinion, howev-
er, is its expansive reading of the market
participant exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause to sanction states'
and localities' expressing their citizens'
views on foreign policy. The modern
formulation of the dormant Commerce
Clause is found in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., in which the Court stated that:
[W]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate
public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose if
found, then the question becomes one
of degree .... 
4 2
The market participant doctrine,
which, as its name suggests, is founded
on the distinction between the state's be-
havior as a market participant rather
than market regulator, is perhaps best
understood as the distinct category of
"legitimate local purposes." It was first
articulated in the 1976 decision Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation, in which
Justice Powell concluded that the State
of Maryland could, as purchaser of aban-
doned cars for purposes of a recycling
program, effectively "restrict its trade to
its own citizens" by imposing more oner-
ous title proof requirements on out-of-
state firms than in-state firms in estab-
lishing eligibility for state subsidies for
processing Maryland-titled abandoned
cars.4 3 Four years later, in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, the Court invoked the exception
when the state acted as a seller. In that
case, the State of South Dakota, which it-
self operated a cement plant, in a time
of shortage refused to sell to out-of-state
buyers.44 Then, in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the
Court sanctioned an executive order by
the Mayor of Boston requiring firms per-
forming city-funded construction pro-
jects to ensure that Boston residents
made up at least half their work force.
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
city-even in this case where it imposed
"restrictions that reach[ed] beyond the
immediate parties with which the gov-
ernment transact[ed] business"-en-
gaged in participation in, rather than
regulation of, the market.4 5
However, a more recent Supreme
Court decision suggests the market par-
ticipant exception may be inapplicable
to cases touching on foreign relations.
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v. Wunnicke, the Court refused to extend
the doctrine to preference for state resi-
dents implemented through market par-
ticipation. 46 The State of Alaska had re-
quired buyers of state owned timber-
mainly in the Japanese market-to pro-
cess the timber in Alaska before ship-
ping outside the state.4 7 Notably, Wun-
nicke is the only market participant doc-
trine case thus far to involve foreign
commerce, and Justice White expressly
distinguished it on this ground from
preceding cases where the doctrine had
shielded state action from dormant
Commerce Clause attack. Justice White
relied on settled precedent to suggest
that a state's latitude to act even in a
solely proprietary capacity is far less
whenever foreign commerce may be af-
fected than it is when only domestic
commerce is involved. 48 Yet, considering
that Justice White also noted special sig-
nificance in the case of natural re-
sources and the imposition of the re-
strictions on resale, it is not clear
whether the presence of foreign com-
merce alone would have sufficed to dis-
tinguish Wunnicke from previous market
participant cases.
49
In sum, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals' use of the market participant ex-
ception goes beyond precedent. The
court, indeed, failed to distinguish be-
tween state action to favor the state's
own citizens, the traditional domain of
the market participant exception, and
state action to encourage political
change in a foreign country. Conse-
quently, its decision could be misinter-
preted to transform the doctrine from a
narrowly limited exception to the
Supreme Court's traditional Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to a constitutional
wild card in foreign affairs.
The Lessons of Namibia Sanctions
Even opponents of apartheid acknowl-
edge that state and local forays into for-
eign policy making on South Africa raise
serious constitutional questions.5 1 In-
deed, given the startling progress toward
dismantling apartheid, one questions
whether state and local sanctions against
South Africa also will soon become
anachronistic. On the theory that U.S.
corporate presence is a force for improv-
ing the condition of non-white workers
in South Africa, the Executive Branch
has consistently opposed sanctions de-
signed to force U.S. businesses to disin-
vest from South Africa.
5 1
Moreover, as noted earlier, the CAAA
contemplates an integrated statutory
scheme of carrots and sticks-with one
hand, imposing sanctions; and, with the
other, conditioning their lifting on
South Africa's meeting certain specific
conditions) 2 Thus, even if state and local
sanctions against South Africa were con-
sidered constitutional before the CAAA's
conditions were met, on the theory that
they were consistent with a federal policy
to impose sanctions against South Africa,
this rationale would disappear with the
lifting of federal sanctions pursuant to
the sanctions' lifting provisions of the
CAAA. State and local action to conform
with federal policy would probably be
necessary to fully implement these feder-
al foreign policy goals. But if the case of
Namibia is any guide, it is questionable
whether states and localities are institu-
tionally capable of reacting to changing
circumstances overseas with the same co-
herence demonstrated by the federal
government.
Unlike the Articles of Confederation
in the 1780's, the nation's survival is not
threatened today by inconsistent and in-
coherent foreign policies of the several
states. Nonetheless, the case of state and
local sanctions against South Africa and
Namibia is a textbook example of the ar-
gument for the exclusive federal man-
agement of the nation's foreign affairs
in all cases. The institutional incapacity
of states and localities to conform their
would-be foreign policies to the federal
government's in a timely fashion, even if
it is their desire to do so, suggest that
states and localities are better off con-
ducting their own affairs rather than the
nation's.
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